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Abstract. Background: Increasing numbers of intelligent healthcare applications 
are developed by analysing big data, on which they are trained. It is necessary to 
assure that such applications will be safe for patients; this entails validation against 
datasets. But datasets cannot be shared easily, due to privacy, and consent issues, 
resulting in delaying innovation. Realistic Synthetic Datasets (RSDs), equivalent to 
the real datasets, are seen as a solution to this. Objective: To develop the outline for 
safety justification of an application, validated with an RSD, and identify the safety 
evidence the RSD developers will need to generate. Method: Assurance case 
argument development approaches were used, including high level data related risk 
identification. Result: An outline of the justification of such applications, focusing 
on the contribution of the RSD. Conclusions: Use of RSD will require specific 
arguments and evidence, which will affect the adopted methods. Mutually 
supporting arguments can result in a compelling justification. 
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1. Introduction 
Advances in technologies have resulted in numerous intelligent healthcare applications, 
providing advice, support as well as diagnosis. Failures in their operation may cause 
harm to patients, by offering incorrect advice, or by making the wrong diagnosis. This is 
increasingly recognised in regulation and standards, where they are seen as medical 
devices [1], [2], in need of safety assurance [3]. Developers are often asked to articulate 
the justification of their application’s safety, known as an assurance case (e.g., UK NHS 
DCB0160 and DCB0129). Assurance cases provide a means of explaining how evidence 
created during development and validation, can allow to claim that an application is 
acceptably safe. Effective assurance of intelligent applications will require validation, by 
testing the application using datasets, representative of the clinical scenarios in which 
they are used. However, datasets cannot be freely used for validation, as they may result 
in compromising the privacy of patients. The use of Realistic Synthetic Datasets (RSDs) 
is seen as a way to overcome this and encourage innovation [4], [5]. The paper presents 
the outline of an assurance justification of an intelligent application, using the RSD based 
approach. The assurance framework provides the aspects that need to be justified, and 
expected types of evidence, in order for an RSD based approach to be used confidently 
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for the validation of intelligent applications. The framework was used to elicit 
requirements for appropriate statistical evidence for the use of RSD, in a proof of concept 
project on generating realistic synthetic datasets for application validation. 
2. Safety Justification of the of the Synthetic Dataset 
Figure 1 shows the identified assurance justification outline, for of an intelligent 
healthcare application following the process in [6]. Claims are expressed as post 
conditions [7], supported by a series of further claims, until they can be supported by 
evidence.  
 
Figure 1. Justification outline (claim and supporting arguments) for an intelligent healthcare application 
(arguments #2 and #3 are relevant to RSD), loosely using the Goal Structuring Notation that is common in 
safety cases. Diamonds denote that the argument need to be further developed. 
A high level claim about assurance is supported by four arguments : a) description 
of the acceptable residual risk, which will eventually need to be balanced against 
expected clinical benefit (arg. #1); b) justification of correctness of the application, 
including testing results, and validation against the RSD (arg. #4); c) justification placing 
our confidence in the claim made by argument #4 (arg. #3); and d) justification that the 
application risks have been identified, including the risks of using an RSD (arg. #2). 
 
Figure 2. Justification for the realism of the Realistic Synthetic Dataset (RSD). 
Figure 2 illustrates the expected arguments of the justification for claiming that the 
RSD is realistic. There are three arguments identified: a) the RSD results in a dataset that 
represents realistically clinical knowledge (e.g., prevalence of a disease), as well as 
outliers; b) statistical equivalence of the real and the synthetic datasets; and c) the 
employed generation methods are fit to satisfy the RSD usage requirements. The 
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statistical equivalence looks at the approach as being a black box, only comparing the 
resultant RSD with the real dataset. However, applications that may be highly critical 
(e.g., secondary care CDS, or large numbers of patients exposed to the risk), a 
justification of the RSDGM itself may be necessary to provide sufficient assurance. 
Tolerance of difference between the two datasets will need justification in the context of 
specific applications. 
3. Establishing the Risk of using the Synthetic Dataset 
Risk identifies the safety significance of failures that may affect the users of a service. A 
safety analysis process will aim to eliminate, or reduce their risk to acceptable levels. 
Achieving this requires identification of the failures, and their likelihood and severity. 
Table 1 summarizes a top-down identification of failures that may be caused due to the 
RSD [8], which are expected to be found in argument #2. 
Table 1. Failure modes applying the RSD, to be considered when using the RSD for application validation.  
RSD Failure Modes Description 
Unrealistic The resultant dataset contains data, based on which, any inferences would be 
wrong or beyond a certain tolerance when compared to reality.  
Coverage RSD does not detect inferences for border cases and outliers. 
Underrepresent Minority populations not sufficiently represented in the synthetic dataset. 
Unwarranted The resultant dataset creates inferences unwarranted in the real data. 
In the context of validating a healthcare application (figure 1), failure modes may: a) 
detect a wrong recommendation (undetected error); b) suggest a false negative on a 
recommendation by the application (undetected inference); c) provide false assurance 
that a minority population is covered; and d) falsely suggest that the application should 
have provided a recommendation (unwarranted inference). 
4. Evidence Supporting Assurance of the Synthetic Dataset 
The arguments supporting the claim about the realism of the RSD, will require different 
types of evidence (Table 2). 
Table 2. Potential evidence suitable to support the arguments for the realism of the RSD (Figure 2) 
Argument Evidence 
3.1.1 – Clinical 
equivalence 
Expert clinical review, comparison with literature, coverage and quality of the 
real data, persona-based testing, outlier testing.  
3.1.2 – Statistical 
equivalence 
Divergence metrics for probability distributions, cross-correlation matrix 
between the two datasets, non-parametric statistical significance,  
3.1.3 – Algorithmic 
justification 
Hyperparameter configuration, probability graphs, divergence metrics minmax 
proof. 
The clinical equivalence argument (3.1.1) is expected to provide independent 
support to the other branches, by not only focusing on comparison of the two datasets, 
but comparing the RSD with reality. This way we can identify problems that the two 
other arguments may not reveal. It will also encourage identification of counter evidence, 
overcoming potential confirmation bias. Persona-based scenarios allow testing for 
outliers and minority representation, based on experts’ knowledge and literature. The 
statistical equivalence argument (3.1.2) focuses on evidence of suitability of the RSD to 
be used in lieu of the real dataset. This can be challenging, as the purpose of the RSD is 
to diverge from the real dataset, in order to preserve privacy. Finally, the algorithmic 
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argument (3.1.3) offers evidence about the RSDGM. This is the branch that is most 
dependent on the adopted method. Methods, such as probabilistic graphs, offer more 
visibility than neural network approaches (e.g., Generative Adversarial Networks). 
5. Conclusions 
Realistic synthetic datasets are a promising approach, for validation and safety assurance 
of intelligent healthcare applications. This will overcome barriers of using real datasets 
due to privacy concerns, enabling development of applications that may increase patient 
benefit. The paper presented an outline for the justification of such an application, 
validated specifically with an RSD. This allows the RSD developers to understand the 
implications of assurance on the generation process. The framework allowed to identify 
design and validation requirements, for an RSD generation method, in a proof of concept 
project. 
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